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COURT-ORDERED CONTRACEPTION IN CALIFORNIA
[I]n the juvenile arena we have largely abandoned the certainties
of a rigid legal system without yet being able to substitute another
kind of well-formed and defined process. It is for this reason that
the juvenile system presents not only many dilemmas but also
grave dangers in view of the unique characteristic of judicial power
-the fact that society entrusts to courts the ultimate sanction of
compulsion.1
A recent American Bar Association Journal article 2 has suggested
that juvenile courts exercise this power of compulsion to order the
insertion of an intrauterine contraceptive device (IUCD) in the case
of juvenile unwed mothers who have had more than one illegitimate
pregnancy. Impressive statistics are cited to demonstrate the high
incidence of multiple illegitimate pregnancies among these juvenile
mothers.3 The IUCD is suggested because it requires no coopera-
tion on the part of the minor for insertion or maintenance, and because
there is relatively little possibility of dangerous side effects.4
The article, using Ohio statutes as examples, postulates that juve-
nile courts have the power to order insertion of a contraceptive device
by analogizing the power of the court over feeble-minded individ-
uals to its power over juveniles.5 These Ohio statutes seem to grant
the courts broader powers of disposition over juveniles6 than over the
feebleminded.1 The article then draws the inference that since the
courts may order sterilization of the feebleminded based on the 1927
United States Supreme Court decision of Buck v. Bell," they could order
sterilization of juveniles." Moreover, because the insertion of contra-
ceptive devices is a milder measure than sterilization, it too could be
ordered. 10
1. N. KITrRIm, THE RIGHT TO Bn DIFFERENT 113 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
K R].
2. Young, Alverson, & Young, Court-Ordered Contraception, 55 A.B.A.J. 223
(1969) [hereinafter cited as Young].
3. Id. at 224. "In one study, 340 illegitimate babies were born to 100 teen-age
girls over a five year period, all but five having more than one child." Id. at 223.
4. Id. at 225.
5. Id. at 224.
6. Omo REv. CoDe. ANN. § 2151.355(I) (Page Supp. 1970).
7. Omo REv. CoDE ANN. § 5125.30 (Page 1954), ay amended, (Page 1970).
8. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
9. Young, supra note 2, at 224-26.
10. Id. at 226.
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The article further suggests that in those states where such broad
powers of disposition are not available to a juvenile court, the court
could still require the insertion of the IUCD as a condition of proba-
tion.1  People v. Blankenship, 2 in which a California appellate court
upheld sterilization as a condition for probation of a male convicted
of a sex offense, is cited to support this proposition. While the con-
traception itself is not rehabilitative, this article asserts that it will buy
time for the social worker to help the mother by conventional means
rather than commit her to an institution.' 3
In exploring the problems which are raised by a juvenile court
ordering contraception, this note will first examine the possible bases
for subjecting juvenile unwed mothers to the jurisdiction of California
courts. Second, this note will consider whether powers of disposition
of juvenile courts permit insertion of an IUCD in a juvenile mother,
either on the case authority of People v. Blankenship'4 or In re Simp-
son,15 or in the exercise of the powers granted juvenile courts under
California statutes. Third, court-ordered contraception as a power of
disposition will be discussed as a possible aid in the rehabilitation of
these young mothers. The note will conclude with a brief discussion
of constitutional aspects of court-ordered contraception.
Jurisdiction Over Unwed Mothers
The authors of the A.B.A.J. article have little difficulty in deter-
mining that the juvenile mother of more than one illegitimate child
would be subject to the jurisdiction of an Ohio juvenile court.16 In
some states, however, subjecting these mothers to the jurisdiction of a
juvenile court would prove difficult. In California for instance, a person
under twenty-one years may come within the jurisdiction of the court
only if she meets the conditions described in sections 600, 601 or 602
of the California Welfare and Institutions Code.
Section 600 gives the court power over juveniles who (1) lack
parents or parental control; (2) are destitute or have no fit place of
upbringing; or (3) are physically dangerous to the public because of a
mental or physical abnormality.1 7 A mere showing of several unwed
pregnancies would not be sufficient to allow a court to declare a juve-
nile a "dependent child"--and thus under its custody-under section
11. See id. at 225.
12. 16 Cal. App. 2d 606, 61 P.2d 352 (1936).
13. Young, supra note 2, at 226.
14. 16 Cal. App. 2d 606, 61 P.2d 352 (1936).
15. 88 Ohio L. Abs. 193, 180 N.E.2d 206 (P. Ct. 1962).
16. Young, supra note 2, at 226.
17. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 600 (West 1966).
1506 [Vol. 23
600. Such pregnancies, however, might be evidence that the young
mother lacks parental control or does not have a fit place of upbring-
ing.
California courts have been reluctant to remove a child from his
or her home environment under section 600 for less than "extreme cases
of neglect, cruelty or continuing exposure toimmorality."' Although
successive illegitimate pregnancies might be evidence of one of these
"extreme cases,"' 9 there is no reason to assume that all, or even most,
unwed juvenile mothers are victims of serious parental failure.20
Section 602 allows the court to declare any minor a ward of
the court who violates any state or federal law or local ordinance, or
who fails to obey a court order under section 601.21 Although a
statute such as section 602 would bring an underage unwed mother
under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court in those states in which
fornication is a crime,22 neither fornication nor bearing illegitimate
children are crimes in California.2 3 Accordingly, merely bearing
illegitimate children is not a violation which would bring a minor within
the court's jurisdiction.
Thus a juvenile unwed mother could only24 fall under the jurisdic-
tion of the court -under section 601, as being "in danger of leading an
idle, dissolute, lewd, or immoral life."2  Indeed, most juvenile court
18. In re Raya, 255 Cal. App. 2d 260, 265, 63 Cal. Rptr. 252, 256 (1967)
(footnotes omitted).
19. "Although a home environment may appear deficient when measured by
dominant socioeconomic standards, interposition by the powerful arm of the public
authorities may lead to worse alternatives." Id. at 265, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 255 (foot-
notes omitted).
20. For a discussion of the dispositions available to the court, in the event that
the juvenile unwed mother did come under the juvenile court's jurisdiction under
CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 600, see text accompanying notes 84-85 infra.
21. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 602 (West 1966).
22. E.g., MASS. GEi. LAws ch. 119, § 52 (1969), which defines "delinquent
child" as "a child between seven and seventeen who violates any city ordinance or
town by-law or who commits any offense against a law of the commonwealth."
Fornication is a crime under MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 272, § 18 (1970).
23. So-called "statutory rape" of a female under eighteen years is only a crime
for the male. CAL. PEm. CoDE § 261.5 (West Supp. 1971), provides: "Unlawful
sexual intercourse is an act of sexual intercourse accomplished with a female not the
wife of the perpetrator, where the female is under the age of 18 years."
24. This is assuming that the only evidence of delinquent behavior is the un-
wed juvenile's pregnancies.
25. CAL. WELF. & INST'Ns CODE § 601 (West 1966) provides: "Any person
under the age of 21 years who persistently or habitually refuses to obey the reasonable
and proper orders or directions of his parents, guardian, custodian or school authori-
ties, or who is beyond the control of such person, or any person who is a habitual
truant from school within the meaning of any law of this State, or who from any
cause is in danger of leading an idle, dissolute, lewd or immoral life, is within the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court which may adjudge such person to be a ward of the
court."
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judges would probably consider an unwed juvenile girl carrying her
second illegitimate child in danger of leading an immoral life. Re-
cently, however, a three judge federal district court ruled in Gonzalez v.
Mailliard26 that that portion of section 601 reading "or who from
any cause is in danger of leading an idle, dissolute, lewd, or immoral
life" is unconstitutional. This decision relied on a line of recent federal
decisions which have held vagrancy statutes similarly worded to section
601 void for vagueness.2 The Gonzalez court, in determining that the
vague language of section 601 would "negate the important proced-
ural rights attaching to an adjudication under section 601 ,"28 stated:
A juvenile facing a § 601 adjudication is guaranteed rights to
hearing, to counsel, to notice, to confrontation and to freedom
from self-incrimination. . . . It is [difficult if not impossible]
to defend against charges that one is "in danger of leading an idle,
dissolute, lewd or immoral life". Of what possible utility is notice
of charges when the charge is merely that one is "dissolute"?
What use is counsel when it is impossible to know what type of
evidence is relevant to rebuttal of the prosecution case?29
The effect of this decision is to remove any basis for bringing a
juvenile unwed mother under the jurisdiction of a California juvenile
court for her pregnancies alone. Nevertheless, the Gonzalez decision
has yet to withstand the scrutiny of the United States Supreme Court, and
there appear to be at least some procedural difficulties blocking af-
firmance," ° if not a prior contrary holding by the Court." Further-
26. Brief for Appellants, Appendix A, Gonzalez v. Mailliard, Civ. No. 50424
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 1971), appeal filed, 40 U.S.L.W. 3019 (U.S. Feb. 9, 1971). Due
to the record of the trial being sent the Supreme Court, the only transcript of the
trial available was Appendix A of the Appellant's brief.
27. Ricks v. District of Columbia, 414 F.2d 1097, 1106-07 (D.C. Cir. 1968)
(statute denominating as a vagrant any person "leading an immoral and profligate life"
entailed so much guesswork as to meaning as to be violative of the Fifth Amendment);
Wheeler v. Goodman, 306 F. Supp. 58 (W.D.N.C. 1969), vacated as moot, 401 U.S.
987 (1971); Goldman v. Knecht, 295 F. Supp. 897 (D. Colo. 1969).
28. Brief for Appellant, Appendix A at xii, n.12, Gonzalez v. Mailliard, Civ.
No. 50424 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 1971), appeal filed 40 U.S.L.W. 3019 (U.S. Feb. 9,
1971).
29. Id. at xii-xiii. After concluding that the quoted portion of § 601 was
unconstitutional, the Gonzalez court enjoined enforcement of that portion of § 601.
Id. at xv.
30. The juveniles arrested in Gonzalez were not prosecuted. The state relied
partially on the defense that there was no case or controversy. Brief for Appellant,
Appendix A at iii, Gonzalez v. Mailliard, Civ. No. 50424 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 1971),
appeal filed, 40 U.S.L.W. 3019 (U.S. Feb. 9, 1971). The district court refused to
accept this argument, noting that plaintiffs were threatened with continued prosecu-
tion under the statute, and that the plaintiffs might be entitled to monetary damages
under the claim that some of the defendants had knowingly attempted to deprive plain-
tiffs of their constitutional rights. Id. at iii-v.
31. The United States Supreme Court refused to strike down a Connecticut
statute similar to the voided portion of CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 601. Mat-
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more, a California court of appeal had previously held in In re Daniel
R.12 that section 601 was not vague.
Although that portion of section 601 directly applicable to juvenile
unwed mothers was held unconstitutional in Gonzalez, it seems certain
that behavior such as juvenile unwed pregnancies will continue to be
viewed with concern by the public. 3  Legislation could be passed giv-
ing juvenile courts jurisdiction over minors who commit specified acts
which would not be crimes for adults. 4  In fact, such a course has
been recommended by the President's Commission on Law Enforce-
ment and the Administration of Justice. The commission suggests that
conduct illegal only for children be circumscribed and specifically
enumerated and that only acts entailing "a real risk of long-range
harm to the child, such as . . . repeatedly becoming pregnant out
of wedlock" remain under the juvenile court's jurisdiction.us
Unless legislation proscribing the juvenile mother's repeated preg-
nancies is passed, or unless such pregnancies show that the minor was
beyond parental control or not living in a fit place of upbringing under
section 600, the minor would not be subject to the jurisdiction of a
California juvenile court. 6 Even if the minor were subject to the
court's jurisdiction, however, there are some additional problems in de-
termining whether the juvenile court has the power to order insertion
of an IUCD.
tiello v. Connecticut, 4 Conn. Cir. 55, 225 A.2d 507 (App. Div. 1966), cert. denied,
154 Conn. 737, 225 A.2d 201 (1966), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 209 (1969). For a
criticism of -the Supreme Court's failure to act see Note, Statutory Vagueness in Juve-
nile Law: The Supreme Court and Mattiello v. Connecticut, 118 U. PA. L. Ray. 143
(1969).
The Gonzalez court took cognizance of Mattiello but proceeded to strike down the
voided portions of section 601 anyway, noting that it was difficult to determine if
the Supreme Court even considered the vagueness doctrine. Brief for Appellant, Ap-
pendix A at xi, n.11, Gonzalez v. Mailliard, Civ. No. 50424 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 1971),
appeal filed, 40 U.S.L.W. 3019 (U.S. Feb. 9, 1971).
32. 274 Cal. App. 2d 749, 752-53, 79 Cal. Rptr. 247, 249 (1969).
33. Indeed, some state legislatures have proposed far more severe sanctions
for dealing with adult unwed pregnancies. Paul, The Return of Punitive Sterilization
Proposals: Current Attacks on Illegitimacy and the AFDC Program, 3 L. & Soc'y Rv.
77 (1968). See also "Limit" Plan for Unwed Mothers, San Francisco Chronicle, Mar.
25, 1972, at 6, col. 6.
34. The Gonzalez decision does not purport to limit the legislature's power to
provide for protective custody for juveniles declared delinquent under "reasonably
clear and definite standards." Brief for Appellant, Appendix A at xv, n.13, Gonzalez
v. Mailliard, Civ. No. 50424 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 1971), appeal filed, 40 U.S.L.W. 3019
(U.S. Feb. 9, 1971).
35. PREsmENr's COMMIssION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & THE ADINIISTrATION
OF JUSTCE, TAsK FORCE REPORT: JuvENuLE DELINQUENCY AND YoUTH CRuai 27
(1967).
36. However, the juvenile unwed mother would still be subject to a juvenile
court's jurisdiction in states where fornication is a crime. See note 22 supra.
May 1972] 1509
Juvenile Courts' Powers of Disposition
Under section 725 of the California Welfare and Institutions Code,
if the juvenile court finds the minor is a person described by sections
601 or 602,17 the court may adjudge the minor a ward of the court
or may place the minor on probation without adjudging the minor a
ward of the court."8 Section 725 has been held to grant juvenile
courts, not declaring the minor a ward of the court, the power to im-
pose conditions of probation which cause the minor to realize the
seriousness of his offense.39 Once the minor is declared a ward of the
court, the court may, under California Welfare and Institutions Code
section 730, order any of the types of treatment referred to in section
727 for a "neglected" child.40 Alternatively, the court may place the
ward under the supervision of a probation officer and impose "all rea-
sonable conditions that it may determine fitting and proper to the
end that justice may be done and the reformation and rehabilitation
of the ward enhanced.'
Contraception as a Condition of Probation
The A.B.A.J. article relies on the authority of a 1936 California
case, People v. Blankenship,"2 for the proposition that a court could
require insertion of a contraceptive device as a condition of probation. 3
In Blankenship the defendant was convicted of statutory rape of a
thirteen year old girl. When apprehended, both he and the girl had
venereal disease. The trial court required that the defendant submit to
a vasectomy as a condition of probation. The court of appeal upheld
the condition, reasoning that the trial court imposed the condition
in an effort to prevent Blankenship from transmitting the disease to
"possible posterity."4  The court decided that the trial court was not
foreclosing Blakenship from procreation since he could have chosen
to serve out his sentence.4
5
Since Blankenship, the discretion of California adult criminal courts
in setting conditions for probation has been limited by People v. Domin-
37. For a discussion of the court's powers of disposition if the minor were subject
to the juvenile court's jurisdiction under California Welfare and Institutions Code
§ 600, see notes 84-85 & accompanying text infra.
38. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 725 (West 1966).
39. In re Bacon, 240 Cal. App. 2d 34, 60, 49 Cal. Rptr, 322, 337 (1966).
40. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 730 (West 1966).
41. Id.
42. 16 Cal. App. 2d 606, 61 P.2d 352 (1936).
43. Young, supra note 2, at 225.
44. People v. Blankenship, 16 Cal. App. 2d 606, 610, 61 P.2d 352, 353
(1936).
45. Id., 61 P.2d at 353-54.
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guez.46 In Dominguez a twenty year old woman had been convicted
of robbery. The woman, mother of two illegitimate children, was
granted probation on condition that she neither live with a man nor
bear another child until married. Her probation was revoked as a result
of a third pregnancy. The court of appeal, in reversing, stated:
A condition of probation which (1) has no relationship to the
crime for which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct
which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids con-
duct which is not reasonably related to future criminality does not
serve the statutory ends of probation and is invalid.47
The court went on to term the authority of Blankenship "dubious
today" for setting unusual condition of probation.48
Applying the standards laid down in Dominguez to the factual
situation in Blankenship, the condition in the latter case appears more
than "dubious"--it seems clearly invalid. A vasectomy would only
foreclose procreation, not future sexual intercourse. Moreover, pro-
creation has no relationship to the crime Blankenship was convicted of-
statutory rape-nor is it criminal conduct, nor is it related to future crim-
inalty. In fact, a vastectomy would not even serve the purpose declared
by the court itself in Blankenship, which was to protect future generations
from a "loathsome disease."4" The operation would not cure Blanken-
ship of venereal disease,50 nor would it prevent him from transmitting
the disease to others.
Furthermore, Blankenship might run afoul of constitutionally
protected rights:
[T]he denial or revocation of benefits if certain conditions are
not met is essentially regulatory activity by government, which
must find compelling justification if constitutional rights are thereby
restricted. 51
Although Blankenship was decided before the Supreme Court declared
the right to procreate a fundamental right,52 any attempt by the state
46. 256 Cal. App. 2d 623, 64 Cal. Rptr. 290 (1967).
47. Id. at 627, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 293. These rules for conditions of probation
were cited with approval by the California Supreme Court in In re Bushman, 1 Cal. 3d
767, 777, 463 P.2d 727, 733, 83 Cal. Rptr. 375, 381 (1970).
48. People v. Dominguez, 256 Cal. App. 2d 623, 627, 64 Cal. Rptr. 290, 293
(1967).
49. People v. Blankenship, 16 Cal. App. 2d 606, 610, 61 P.2d 352, 353 (1936).
50. Blankenship offered to prove that the disease he had was curable and that
he was able to afford the cure. The trial court thereupon refused to grant probation
and ordered Blankenship to serve out his sentence. Id. at 608, 61 P.2d at 353.
Blankenship was a day late in offering his proof, but the court's perfunctory manner
suggests that its motives in requiring the vasectomy were punitive rather than re-
habilitative.
51. Note, Another Look at Unconstitutional Conditions, 117 U. PA. L. REv.
144, 145 (1968) (footnotes omitted).
52. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
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to impose a condition such as in Blankenship today would have to meet
the compelling state interest test. 53 While the state interest in prevent-
ing the spread of venereal disease may indeed be compelling, vene-
real disease, as previously demonstrated, has no rational connection
to a vasectomy.
Therefore, in view of both the restrictions upon setting conditions
of probation under People v. Dominguez54 and the constitutional dif-
ficulties involved, 55 People v. Blankenship" can only be considered
worthless as authority for the proposition that a juvenile court could
require an underage unwed mother to submit to insertion of an IUCD
as a condition for probation.
The extent to which the Dominguez rules can be applied to juve-
nile court proceedings is open to question, however, since that case in-
volved conditions imposed by an adult criminal court. Significantly,
the power to impose conditions before granting probation is more lim-
ited for adults under the Penal Code57 than it is for juveniles under
the general wording of California Welfare and Institutions Code section
730.58 Conditions of probation for adults are restricted by certain rules
within the Penal Code59 and by the rules laid down in Dominguez.6°
Under section 730, on the other hand, the juvenile court is limited in
its power to impose conditions only by the necessity that the condi-
tion be "reasonable" and that it be directed toward "the end that jus-
tice may be done and the reformation and rehabilitation of the ward
enhanced.""'
This wording of section 730 is in line with the noncriminal pur-
pose of juvenile courts,62 and the fact that an adjudication of ward-
53. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
54. 256 Cal. App. 2d 623, 64 Cal. Rptr. 290 (1967).
55. See notes 51-53 & accompanying text supra.
56. 16 Cal. App. 2d 606, 61 P.2d 352 (1936).
57. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1203.1 (West 1966).
58. In In re Bacon, 240 Cal. App. 2d 34, 59-60, 49 Cal. Rptr. 322, 337 (1966)
juvenile courts not declaring minors to be wards of the court were held, under Cal-
ifornia Welfare and Institutions Code section 725(a), to possess broad discretion in
setting conditions of probation which would cause the minor to realize the serious-
ness of his offense. This power to impose conditions of probation under section
725(a) must surely be more limited than the power to impose conditions under sec-
tion 730, where enhancement of the minor's reformation and rehabilitation is di-
rected.
59. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1203.1 (West 1966) provides that a court may, for
example, provide for reparation, fine up to the maximum extent provided for by law,
place probationer in a county work camp, require bonds, or impose other conditions
enumerated therein.
60. See note 47 & accompanying text supra.
61. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 730 (West 1966).
62. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 503 (West 1966). But see In re Mikkel-
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ship is not equivalent to a criminal conviction.6 3  Each juvenile who
comes before the juvenile court must be treated as an individualized
case and be provided whatever treatment and care will transform him
into a useful citizen. "The juvenile disposition, it was long ago postu-
lated, must fit the child's needs, not his offense." 64  The requirement
that "justice be done" when imposing conditions of probation under
section 730 must therefore be subordinated to the requirement that the
disposition be done for the minor's welfare.65 Thus, the question
whether juvenile courts have the power to require insertion of an 1UCD
as a condition of probation resolves itself into the question whether
such a condition would aid in the minor's rehabilitation. 6
Compelling the Ward to Submit to Insertion of IUCD
The requirement that an IUCD be inserted as a condition of pro-
bation under section 730 has at least an element of volition. If the
minor refuses to submit to the contraception, she has the alternatives,
albeit grim ones, of being institutionalized or being sent to a foster
home. The authors of the A.B.A.J. article suggest, however, that in
Ohio an unwed juvenile mother could be compelled to submit to inser-
tion of an IUCD.17  This power is said to arise from the case of In
re Simpson,6" in which Ohio courts were held to have the power to
order sterilization of feebleminded women without an enabling statute
when there is not sufficient institutional space for commitment of
such women. Since the Ohio statues seem to grant broader powers of
disposition to juvenile courts69 than to probate courts,7" the authors in-
fer that a juvenile court has the power to order sterilization of a minor. 71
The article rejects a solution as drastic as sterilization for the problem
of unwed juvenile mothers, but takes the more "enlightened" approach
sen, 226 Cal. App. 2d 467, 471, 38 Cal. Rptr. 106, 108 (1964); In re Contreras,
109 Cal. App. 2d 787, 789, 241 P.2d 631, 633 (1952).
63. CAL. WaLF. & INST'NS CODE t 503 (West 1966).
64. KriTrm, supra note 1, at 133.
65. See, e.g., In re Walker, 159 Cal. App. 2d 463, 468, 328 P.2d 32, 35;
In re Corrigan, 134 Cal. App. 2d 751, 754, 286 P.2d 32, 35 (1955).
66. See notes 89-106 & accompanying text infra.
67. Young, supra note 2, at 224.
68. 88 Ohio L. Abs. 193, 180 N.E.2d 206 (P. Ct. 1962).
69. Omo REV. CoDE ANN. § 2151.35(D) (Page 1968), as amended, Ohio Rev.
Code. Ann. § 2151.355(1) (Page Supp. 1970) provides in part for the juvenile court
judge to "[m]ake such further disposition as the court deems proper."
70. Under OHO REv. CODE ANN. § 5125.30 (Page 1970) the probate judge,
when there is insufficient space in institutions, is directed to "take such action and
make such order as he deems necessary and advisable to provide for the detention,
supervision, care, and maintenance of said mentally retarded, at the expense of the
county, until such time as he may be received in a hospital for the mentally retarded."
71. Young, supra note 2, at 225.
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that insertion of contraceptive devices should be ordered for such
juveniles.7 2 The article reasons:
If, as demonstrated, so drastic a preventive of pregnancy as steri-
lization is not beyond the powers of the juvenile court, the court
must necessarily have the power to order the use of a proper
contraceptive device, since the greater always includes the lesser. 73
The support for this conclusion is weak. In re Simpson,74 decided
in an Ohio county probate court, has neither been affirmed by a higher
court nor cited by any court. Moreover, the decision relies on an un-
published memorandum by a Maryland circuit court which concluded
that court-ordered sterilization arises out of the general equity powers
of the court. 75  The Ohio court, however, merely alluded to the
Maryland memorandum, and makes no analysis of how such equity
powers would arise in Ohio.
The Ohio court also quoted extensively from Buck v. Bell,76 the
United States Supreme Court case holding sterilization of febbleminded
individuals under proper circumstances to be constitutional. An ex-
amination of Buck reveals that Mr. Justice Holmes went to great lengths
to point out the procedural safeguards present under the Virginia stat-
ute which prevented the compulsory sterilization from becoming a
possible source of abuse. 7  The Ohio court, on the other hand, acted
without specific statutory authorization, and apparently held only
one hearing before ordering the operation. 78  In fact, the Simpson
court's primary reason for ordering sterilization was that there was no
institutional space available for commitment of Miss Simpson. 79  This
reasoning raises serious equal protection problems in view of the Su-
72. Id.
73. Id. at 226.
74. 88 Ohio L. Abs. 193, 180 N.E.2d 206 (P. Ct. 1962).
75. Id. at 195, 180 N.E.2d at 208.
76. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
77. Id. at 206-07.
78. In re Simpson, 88 Ohio L. Abs. 193, 180 N.E.2d 206 (P. Ct. 1962).
The record is unclear as to the extent of the hearing held. Some medical testi-
mony seems to have been given to the effect that Miss Simpson's mother had to take
care of her daughter's first illegitimate child. Id. at 194, 180 N.E.2d at 207. But if
Miss Simpson's mother was capable of caring for the infant, then Justice Holmes' fears
of "[tlhree generations of imbeciles" would not seem to apply here. There is no way
of determining from the reported case on what facts the court based its opinion that
Miss Simpson's offspring would be mentally deficient.
79. The court notes that lack of space forced an institution to release one young
man who was so incapable of taking care of himself that he drowned. Id. Ironically,
Miss Simpson, who apparently was completely incapable of caring for a baby, was
sterilized and then left to run the same risks of the outside world that killed the
young man about whom the court expressed such concern. Yet the Ohio court
blithely asserted that it was acting with Miss Simpson's welfare in mind. Id. at 196,
180 N.E.2d at 208.
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preme Court's holding in Skinner v. Oklahoma ° in which the classifi-
cation of certain types of criminals as subject to sterilization was held
to be arbitrary. Sterilization, without statute, of only those feeble-
minded individuals for whom there is no institutional space at one
particular time is equally arbitrary. Furthermore, the "eugenic" rea-
sons for which sterilization was upheld in the Buck case have been
coming under strong attack recently. 81
The A.B.A.J. article's inference that juvenile courts could compel
sterilization of juvenile wards of the court is not applicable to California
law. California has a statute providing for "asexualization" of mental
defectives under certain conditions and after complying with certain
procedural safeguards.8 2 It would be difficult to infer, however, as the
A.B.A.J. article does under Ohio statutes, that California courts could
compel sterilization of juveniles by comparing the specifically worded
asexualization statute to the general powers of disposition granted un-
der section 730 of the California Welfare and Institutions Code. Even
if the eugenic justification for the asexualization statute-the threat of
"[t]hree generations of imbeciles" 83-were undisputed today, no such
compelling reason would justify sterilizing juveniles.
If the power of a juvenile court to order contraception in Cali-
fornia cannot be inferred from the asxeualization statute, perhaps
such power could be found within the words granting dispositional
powers to juvenile courts. Section 727 of the California Welfare and
Institutions Code provides that the juvenile court may
make any and all reasonable orders for the care, supervision,
custody, conduct, maintenance, and support of [a minor adjudged
a ward of the court] including medical treatment .... 84
It is unclear how limiting this language is to a juvenile court's powers
of disposition. Since the words "medical treatment" seem to modify
"conduct," it could be argued that insertion of an IUCD would be a
"reasonable" order for "medical treatment" of the minor's "conduct."
However, it seems more likely that this provision was intended to
cover emergency situations where parental beliefs interfered with a
child's receiving proper medical treatment.8 5 It must be remembered
80. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
81. E.g., Bligh, Sterilization and Mental Retardation, 51 A.B.A.I. 1059 (1965);
Myerson, Certain Medical and Legal Phases of Eugenic Sterilization, 52 YALE L.J.
618 (1943).
82. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 7254 (West Supp. 1971), formerly CAL.
WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 6624 (West 1966).
83. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927).
84. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 727 (West Supp. 1971).
85. See People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 Il1. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769, cert.
denied, 344 U.S. 824 (1952).
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that in all juvenile proceedings and dispositions "the welfare of the
child . . . is of paramount consideration."86 Therefore, the reason-
ableness of an order requiring insertion of an IUCD would probably
hinge, as does requiring such insertion as a condition of probation," on
whether insertion of an IUCD would help reform and rehabilitate the
minor.88
Contraception in Aid of Rehabilitation
Since the authority for juvenile court action depends upon its re-
habilitative effect, contraception must be examined as an aid in re-
habilitation. Although the authors of the A.B.A.J. article admit that
the mere insertion of an IUCD is not rehabilitative, they do feel that
at least it can buy time for "more conventional methods of social case-
work, which may eventually result in rehabilitation."8 9 However
meritorious this suggestion sounds in theory, it must be weighed in the
light of practical experience. The efficacy of social casework per-
formed by probation officers has been doubted in several recent studies
of the California juvenile court system. One study found:
California probation officers in the larger counties have anywhere
from 50 to 250 youths to supervise, in contrast to the recom-
mended average of sixty. Sixty-two percent of the counties re-
porting [to the study] state that the probation department is so
understaffed that the probation officers cannot do an effective job
of supervising youths on probation.9"
Another study casts doubt on the entire process of "rehabilitating"
juveniles, terming the following problem one of those critical in im-
peding juvenile justice in California:
[I]n many instances, case decisions seem to be based upon con-
siderations of expediency and administrative convenience rather
than upon the objectives of rehabilitation and social justice. This
is partly because juvenile courts and official delinquency control
agencies have been seriously overtaxed by the sizeable growth in
the number of children brought to their attention without com-
mensurate increases in available services, staff, or treatment facil-
ities. 91
86. In re Walker, 159 Cal. App. 2d 463, 468, 324 P.2d 32, 35 (1958).
87. See notes 42-66 & accompanying text supra.
88. See notes 89-106 & accompanying text infra.
89. Young, supra note 2, at 226.
90. Note, The California Juvenile Court, 10 STAN. L. REV. 471, 511-12
(1958) (footnotes omitted). Although this study is fourteen years old, there is no
reason to doubt that the recent explosion of drug abuse has done other than exacerbate
the problems of inadequate staffs and facilities.
91. REPORT OF THE GovERNOR'S SPECIAL STUDY COMMISSION ON JUVENILE
JUSTICE, PART I, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGES IN CALIFORNIA'S JUVENILE COURT
LAw 12 (1960) [hereinafter cited as SPECIAL COMMISSION ON JUVENILE JUSTICE].
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Considering these shortcomings in the California youth correctional
system, it seems doubtful that court-ordered contraception could be com-
bined successfully with some form of postcourtroom treatment. Social
caseworkers and probation officers, already overburdened, are not
likely to spend considerable time with the juvenile mother. Assuming
pregnancy is the only manifestation of delinquency the juvenile has
shown, the probation officer could not be blamed for spending more
time with juveniles who have shown tendencies toward behavior of
greater immediate threat to society.
Furthermore, the prophylactic effect of court-ordered contracep-
tion might tempt a court to order contraception regardless of whatever
postcourtroom treatment the minor might receive. Since the juvenile
could not become pregnant, she would not further burden the juvenile
system, at least not for the behavior causing her to be subject to the
juvenile court's jurisdiction.
The A.B.A.J. article also asserts that juvenile courts sometimes
encounter "cases where the child's pregnancy is not the result of ig-
norance or accident, but of a deliberate design on the part of the child
to gain its own ends."' 92 If this is true, then the court-ordered inser-
tion of an IUCD in the minor and her subsequent release into the
outside world would, in effect, deny treatment to the child who needed
it most. Underage girls who become pregnant repeatedly by accident
or through ignorance would most likely be eager to accept an offer
of some form of protection against another long and arduous pregnancy;
such acceptance would obviate any need for compulsion. Girls who
are deliberately seeking pregnancy as a means to some deeper
psychological ends, however, need more extensive treatment than in-
sertion of a prophylactic. Prophylactics, although perhaps the sim-
plest and most obvious solution to the problem of juvenile unwed
mothers, could not substitute for psychiatric or some other proven
method of treatment for disturbed children. Professor Kittrie has
commented upon a tendency of American courts and legislatures to con-
fuse expediency with rehabilitation in connection with other instances
of compulsion:
American experience with sterilization, shock therapy, and lobot-
omy demonstrates the difficulty in drawing a clear line between
what the therapeutic state does for its wards and what it does to
them.93
The United States Supreme Court seems to be inclined toward the
view that treatment must be "for" the juvenile ward and not merely
administered "to" him.
92. Young, supra note 2, at 225.
93. Krrmm, supra note 1, at 338.
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For many years juveniles were not afforded the procedural rights
guaranteed every adult citizen. 94 Beginning with Kent v. United States,"'
and continuing with In re Gault" and In re Winship,97 the United
States Supreme Court has extended many adult procedural safeguards
to minors. These safeguards9" have been required even though juvenile
proceedings are theoretically not criminal in nature99 and an adjudi-
cation of wardship is not equivalent to a criminal conviction. These
safeguards, however, only cover hearings at which a juvenile might be
adjudged delinquent with possible institutionalization as a result.'00
They do not extend to the dispositional phase of the juvenile court pro-
ceedings:
Read at large [Kent, Gault, and Winship] are equally clear in dis-
claiming any purpose to limit juvenile courts in the search for
dispositional methods which will aid in the rehabilitation of chil-
dren properly found delinquent.' 0 '
The reason that adult safeguards have been limited to the pre-
dispositional phase is probably because requiring adult safeguards in
the dispositional stage would make it virtually impossible for a juvenile
court to mete out justice and treatment on a case by case basis. Yet,
the absence of these safeguards seems to result in arbitrary, rather
than individualized, disposition of a case:
There is an absence of well-defined, empirically derived standards
and norms to guide juvenile court judges, probation, and law en-
forcement officials in their decision making. Consequently, in-
stead of a uniform system of justice, varied systems based upon
divergent policies and value scales are in evidence. Actually,
[whatever disposition occurs] seems to depend more upon the com-
munity in which the offense is committed than upon the intrinsic
merits of the individual case. 10 2
A system which relies so completely on the discretion of the judge can-
94. For a brief discussion of the history of juvenile courts, see In re Gault,
387 U.S. 1, 14-22 (1967).
95. 383 U.S. 541 (1966) (complete hearing must be held before juvenile court
could waive jurisdiction in favor of adult criminal court).
96. 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (due process must be complied with in reference to ade-
quate and timely notice; notice of right to counsel; child's privilege against self-
incrimination; and where a valid confession is lacking, child has the right to con-
frontation and cross-examination).
97. 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (juvenile proceedings held to standard of proof beyond
a reasonable doubt).
98. See generally Comment, The California Juvenile: His Rights and Remedies,
1 PAC. L.J. 350 (1970).
99. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 503 (West 1966).
100. Id.
101. Cooley, Court Control Over Treatment of Juvenile Offenders, 9 DUQUESNE
L. REV. 613, 615 (1971).
102. SPECIAL COMMISSION ON JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 91, at 12.
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not help but be susceptible to abuse. 10 3 It appears, therefore, that
a juvenile court judge could presently order contraception regardless
of rehabilitative effect.
However, as the United States Supreme Court has noted,
some courts have recently indicated that appropriate treatment is
essential to the validity of juvenile custody, and therefore that ajuvenile may challenge the validity of his custody on the ground
that he is not in fact receiving any special treatment.10 4
If a juvenile can challenge the validity of his custody, perhaps he could
also challenge the validity of a condition for probation 0 5 or the valid-
ity of a juvenile court order,10 6 if either were of doubtful rehabilita-
tive value.
The probable lack of rehabilitative value resulting from court-or-
dered contraception becomes doubly serious in view of the constitu-
tional rights with which court-ordered contraception might interfere.
Constitutional Barriers to Court-Ordered Contraception
Any statute or administrative order authorizing or compelling
involuntary medical or surgical treatment has the possibility of be-
ing scrutinized and countermanded by the Supreme Court of the
United States. 07
Professor Thomas Reed Powell's prophetic statement prompted by
Skinner v. Oklahoma'08 seems particularly applicable to the problem of
court-ordered contraception, since this form of medical treatment might
interfere with any of several constitutionally protected rights. The
rights possibly affected by court-ordered contraception are: (1) the
right to free exercise of religion; (2) the right to bodily privacy; and
(3) the right to bear children.
Right to Free Exercise of Religion
A juvenile unwed mother or her parents or guardian might claim
that any form of contraception would violate her religious beliefs, thus
interfering with her right to freely exercise her religion. 0 9 Neverthe-
less, the United States Supreme Court has declared that this right is
not -unrestricted. In Prince v. Massachusetts"' a Jehovah's Witness
103. For a harrowing account of a Philadelphia lawyer's experiences with "in-
dividualized" juvenile justice see L. FORER, "No ONE WILL LISsEN" (1970).
104. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 22-3 n.30 (1967).
105. See notes 42-66 & accompanying text supra.
106. See notes 67-88 & accompanying text supra.
107. Powell, Compulsory Vaccination and Sterilization: Constitutional Aspects, 21
N.C.L. R v. 253 (1943) [hereinafter cited as Powell].
108. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
109. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
110. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
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was convicted of the violation of the state child labor law for permitting
her nine year old daughter to sell religious tracts on city streets. In
upholding the conviction, the Court stated:
[N]either rights of religion nor rights of parenthood are beyond
limitation. . . . [The state's] authority is not nullified merely
because the parent grounds his claim to control the child's course
of conduct on religion or conscience. . . . The right to practice
religion freely does not include liberty to expose . . . the child
• . . to ill health or death."'
Several state courts have followed the reasoning in Prince in de-
termining that blood transfusions could be made to children"' over
their parents' strong religious objections if necessary to save life. Re-
cently, a three judge district court, also following the Prince reason-
ing, refused to either enjoin future proceedings in which guardians
were declared over children whose religious beliefs forbade medical
treatment or declare a statute authorizing such proceedings uncon-
stitutional. 113 By affirming this decision the Supreme Court seems to
indicate that where the health or life of a child is involved, the state may
have an interest which overrides the free exercise of religion.
However, all of these cases unquestionably involved emergency sit-
uations in which a life could have been at stake. A New York court
in In re Seiferth,114 on the other hand, has refused to allow the appoint-
ment of a guardian over a boy in need of an operation to correct a cleft
palate and harelip. The boy objected to the operation not on the basis
of any formal religious beliefs, but merely from a mistrust of medicine
and a strong belief in the healing powers of the mind. The court held
that since the operation was not an emergency, the state should not
interfere.
Court-ordered contraception would rarely involve emergency situ-
ations. If further pregnancies would endanger the minor's life, then
perhaps contraception could be justified over religious objections. In
most cases, however, the health of the young mother would not be at
stake.
The United States Supreme Court, in Sherbert v. Verner,115 required
a compelling governmental interest to sustain a South Carolina rul-
ing that a Seventh Day Adventist could be refused unemployment bene-
fits because her religion forbade her to work Saturdays. The Court
stated:
111. Id. at 166-67.
112. People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 11. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769, cert. de-
nied, 344 U.S. 824 (1952); State v. Perricone, 37 N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751 (1962).
113. Jehovah's Witnesses v. King County Hosp. Unit No. 1, 278 F. Supp. 488
(1967), aff'd mer., 390 U.S. 598.
114. 309 N.Y. 80, 127 N.E.2d 820 (1955).
115. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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It is basic that no showing merely of a rational relationship to
some colorable state interest would suffice [to justify a substantial
infringement of the free exercise of religion]; in this highly sensi-
tive area, "[o]nly the gravest abuses, endangering paramount in-
terests, give occasion for permissible limitation," Thomas v. Collins,
323 U.S. 516, 530.116
Therefore, if the juvenile's health is not endangered, on a showing
that court-ordered contraception would entail a "substantial infringe-
ment,"'17 of the juvenile's right to free exercise of religion, the state
would probably have to justify its action with a compelling state in-
terest." 8
Right to Bodily Privacy
Over sixty-seven years ago, in Jacobson v. Massachusetts,"9 the
Supreme Court ruled that vaccination of individuals against their will
was valid. While the Court seemed to recognize a freedom from intru-
sions into a person's body, it nevertheless held this freedom subject to
the safety of the public "under the pressure of great dangers."' 20
More recently, the Supreme Court has indicated that the Fourth
Amendment restricts casual intrusions by the state into a person's bodily
privacy.' 2 ' An invasion into an individual's bodily security to search
for evidence of a crime was held invalid in Schmerber v. California,-22
unless supported by a "clear indication"' 28 that such search was neces-
sary. A number of recent federal decisions have followed the Schmer-
ber test in border searches of body cavities.' 2 4  Invasion of a woman's
vagina to search for narcotics has been termed "a serious invasion of
personal privacy and dignity"' 25 in one decision where there was no
"clear indication" that the search was necessary.
The freedom to be secure from governmental intrusions into the
body has not been declared absolute. Where the state interest was
116. Id. at 406.
117. Id.
118. For a somewhat different approach to the problem of religious freedom see
Note, Court-Ordered Contraception-A Reasonable Alternative to Institutionaliza-
tion for Juvenile Unwed Mothers?, 1970 Wis. L. Rav. 899, 905-06. See notes
135-41 & accompanying text infra.
119. 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
120. Id. at 29.
121. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 769-70 (1966); cf. Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
122. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
123. Id. at 770.
124. Morales v. United States, 406 F.2d 1298 (9th Cir. 1969); Huguez v. United
States, 406 F.2d 366 (9th Cir. 1968); Rivas v. United States, 368 F.2d 703 (9th Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 945 (1967).
125. Morales v. United States, 406 F.2d 1298, 1300 (9th Cir. 1969), quoting
Henderson v. United States, 390 F.2d 805, 808 (9th Cir. 1967).
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deemed of sufficient weight, even bodily intrusions causing perma-
nent effects have been permitted. 26 However, the zealousness of fed-
eral courts in scrutinizing previous cases involving invasions into bod-
ily privacy indicates that future intrusions into bodily security will not
be passed over lightly, especially where the justification for such intru-
sion is far less compelling'2 7 than the prevention of infectious diseases
or of narcotics smuggling.
Right to Bear Children
Procreation was declared a fundamental right in Skinner v. Okla-
homa,128 in which Oklahoma attempted to subject only certain classes of
criminals to sterilization. The state could show no justification for
this classification and the statute was held invalid. This right was not
declared unrestricted, however, and court-ordered contraception would
only be a temporary interference with this right. Nearly thirty years
ago, Professor Powell would not venture a guess as to what the United
States Supreme Court
would do with milder engenic measures [than sterilization] except
to make clear that they would be zealous in insisting upon strong
scientific support for the necessity and the efficacy of prophylactic
prescriptions and upon adequate procedural safeguards in picking
the persons subjected to them.129
The California Supreme Court in People v. Belous3 ° has gone
beyond the Skinner holding and, while holding the former California
antiabortion statute void for vagueness, has stated that a woman has a
fundamental right to choose whether to bear children.' 31  The court
also warned that any attempt to abridge this right must be supported
by a compelling state reason. 132  Accordingly, assuming compliance
with adequate procedural safeguards," 3 a California juvenile court or-
dering contraception might have to show a compelling state interest 134
to override a minor's objection that such contraception was interfering
with her constitutional rights.
Possible State Interests in Ordering Contraception
An examination of possible justifications for compulsory contra-
ception does not reveal any that are "compelling."' 5  It would be
126. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
127. See notes 135-41 & accompanying text infra.
128. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
129. Powell, supra note 107, at 263 (emphasis added).
130. 71 Cal. 2d 954, 458 P.2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969).
131. Id. at 963, 458 P.2d at 199, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 359 (dictum).
132. Id. at 964, 458 P.2d at 200, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 360.
133. But see notes 94-103 & accompanying text supra.
134. See notes 135-41 & accompanying text infra.
135. It could be argued that the state has a compelling interest in controlling
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logically absurd to claim that contraception would have any positive
effect on the morals of the minor, since contraception would only
prevent pregnancy and not sexual relations. Nor does the argument
that contraception would rehabilitate the minor carry much weight. 3 '
Probably the best argument in favor of compulsory contraception
would be along the lines of Mr. Justice Holmes' reasoning in Buck v.
Bell,1 7 that people who are already burdens on the state should not
complain if the state calls upon them to make some sacrifices when
others are called upon to make far more serious sacrifices.' But
the Buck decision was referring to people who were permanent burdens
on the state, and whose progeny were allegedly likely to become per-
manent burdens. 39  There is no eugenic likelihood that children of
unwed juveniles will be permanent burdens on the state.
Furthermore, in Buck a sterilization could only be ordered after
complying with procedural safeguards in an enabling statute. 40 There
are no statutory guarantees against abuses of power in cases of court-
ordered contraception. Finally, this type of argument discards any no-
tion of disposition done for the treatment of the minor. A court using
reasoning similar to Mr. Justice Holmes' would be open to charges that
it was acting, not in the minor's best interest, but rather from a vague
fear of society being swamped by minority races.' 4' Such a reason for
a disposition is hardly in keeping with the general purpose of juvenile
proceedings-the reformation and rehabilitation of the juvenile.
the population explosion. This argument would be countered, however, with statis-
tics indicating that a state-wide policy of court-ordered contraception would effect a
discriminatory classification against nonwhites in violation of the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Between 1960 and 1967, for example, the
birth rate for nonwhites between the ages of fifteen and nineteen has ranged as high as
1200% and no lower than 890% the birth rate of whites in the same age bracket in
the United States. UNrrEE STATES DEP'T op HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE,
PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, NATALTY STA-
Tisncs ANALYsIs, UNTD STATES, 1965-1967, SEsEs 21, No. 19, table 23, at 33.
Statistics have been used in the past to invalidate state action effecting racial dis-
crimination even though the action was valid on its face. Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
118 U.S. 356 (1886).
136. See notes 89-106 & accompanying text infra.
137. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
138. ld. at 207.
139. "The three generations of imbeciles are enough." Id. But see, e.g., Bligh,
Sterilization and Mental Retardation, 51 A.B.A.J. 1059 (1965); Myerson, Certain
Medical and Legal Phases of Eugenic Sterilization, 52 YALE L.J. 618 (1943).
140. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 206-07 (1927).
141. This charge has already been leveled in connection with dispositions made by
Philadelphia juvenile court judges. "[MIany [black juvenile mothers] are sent to
correctional institutions, not because they are dangerous but because society wants to
keep down the birth rate among poor black girls." L. FORER, "No ONE WILL LISSEN"
165 (1970).
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In People v. Dominguez,'142 the California court of appeal warned
of the dangers inherent in the power to impose conditions of proba-
tion:
The burden on the taxpayers to maintain illegitimate children at
the public expense is a grave problem, but a court cannot use its
awesome power in imposing conditions of probation to vindicate
the public interest in reducing the welfare rolls by applying un-
reasonable conditions of probation. The interest of the public
in saving money for the taxpayers is by no means the same thing
as the public interest in the reformation and rehabilitation of of-
fenders.143
The above language, concerning conditions imposed in an adult crimi-
nal court, applies with even greater force to a juvenile court either
ordering contraception or requiring it as a condition of probation, since
the primary purpose of any juvenile court action is reformation and re-
habilitation.
Conclusion
Since Gonzalez v. Mailliard44 a California juvenile court would
not be able to subject a juvenile unwed mother to its jurisdiction. 45
Even if there were no jurisdictional problems, the power of a court to
order contraception in a juvenile -unwed mother, or require it as a con-
dition of probation, would probably require a showing that such action
would at least aid in the rehabilitation of the minor. Contraception
alone would be virtually useless in rehabilitating the juvenile mother.
It also seems unlikely that contraception would be of more than mini-
mal help in a program of rehabilitation. In fact, contraception and
subsequent probation may hinder rehabilitation by diverting aid into
more obviously needed channels, since contraception would "cure" any
further immediate manifestations of that behavior which caused the
young mother to be delinquent. Compelling a juvenile mother to wear
an IUCD should not be used as a means for a juvenile court to avoid
its obligation to provide the juvenile with proper treatment.
Furthermore, any court ordering contraception runs grave risks
of trammeling constitutionally protected rights of free exercise of reli-
gion, freedom of bodily privacy, and the freedom to choose whether
to bear children. At the present time the state could not demonstrate
any overriding interest sufficient to justify interference with these con-
stitutional rights.
142. 256 Cal. App. 2d 623, 64 Cal. Rptr. 290 (1967).
143. Id. at 628, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 294 (emphasis added).
144. Brief for Appellant, Appendix A, Gonzalez v. Mailliard, Civil No. 50424
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 1971), appeal filed, 40 U.S.L.W. 3019 (U.S. Feb. 9, 1971).
145. This statement is made assuming that pregnancy is the only evidence of way-
wardness by either the juvenile or her parents.
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Therefore, a balancing of the positive and negative effects to the
juvenile and society of a court ordering contraception or requiring it as
a condition of probation shows that the possibilities for abuse out-
weigh any possible benefit. A juvenile court ought not to compel the
youthful mother to submit to insertion of an 1UCD or require such
submission as a condition of probation.
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